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Abstract
Background: The detrimental impact of dominant corporations active in health-harming commodity industries is
well recognised. However, to date, existing analyses of the ways in which corporations influence health have paid
limited attention to corporate market power. Accordingly, the public health implications of concentrated market
structures, the use of anti-competitive market strategies, and the ways in which market power mediates the
allocation and distribution of resources via market systems, remain relatively unexplored. To address this gap, this
paper aimed to identify and explore key literature that could inform a comprehensive framework to examine
corporate market power from a public health perspective. The ultra-processed food (UPF) industry was used to
provide illustrative examples.
Methods: A scoping review of a diverse range of literature, including Industrial Organization, welfare economics,
global political economy and antitrust policy, was conducted to identify important concepts and metrics that could
be drawn upon within the field of public health to understand and explore market power. The Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) model, a guiding principle of antitrust policy and the regulation of market power, was used as
an organising framework.
Results: We described each of the components of the traditional SCP model and how they have historically been
used to assess market power through examining the interrelations between the structure of industries and markets,
the conduct of dominant firms, and the overall ability of markets and firms to efficiently allocate and distribute the
scarce resources.
Conclusion: We argue that the SCP model is well-placed to broaden public health research into the ways in which
corporations influence health. In addition, the development of a comprehensive framework based on the key
findings of this paper could help the public health community to better engage with a set of policy and regulatory
tools that have the potential to curb the concentration of corporate power for the betterment of population health.
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Background
The public health community has for decades identified
the risks associated with the strategies and practices
used by corporations that profit from health-harming
commodities [1–7]. Recently, public health scholars in
the emerging field of the corporate and commercial
determinants of health (CDoH) have called for increased
scrutiny of the power of corporations active in health-
harming industries and its influence on population
health [8–12]. Indeed, it is extensive power that confers
corporations with the ability to shape many different
aspects of society. Corporate power is present in socio-
political aspects such as policy-making processes; in the
supply chains and retail environments that structure
product affordability, accessibility and availability; and in
the consumption habits of individuals around the world
[13]. To date, however, the public health literature has
mainly explored corporate power in terms of its impact
on population health via its political, regulatory and gov-
ernance influence [14]. While analyses that focus on
how corporations influence policies and regulations are
undoubtedly important, we argue that insufficient atten-
tion has been devoted to understanding and examining
the market power of corporations as a determinant of
health, and indeed as a key explanation and source of
corporate political power.
In market economies, the market system is the institu-
tional context wherein most economic activities, notably
the allocation of resources and profit accumulation, are
coordinated [15–17]. Understanding who gets what and
why, and at what cost, as mediated by market systems
requires an understanding of market power [18]. Market
power, like the concept of power in general, is a
contested subject. In this paper, we draw upon Stiglitz’
(2017) description of market power as the ability of
firms to engender anti-competitive market conditions
through conduct that prevents, lessens or distorts the
structure and process of competition [19]. The primary
goal of shaping competition can be understood as
creating anti-competitive market conditions conducive
to generating sustained profit margins over what
would otherwise be possible in a truly competitive
market [19, 20]. This, in turn, can grant the ability to
accumulate substantial wealth and resources over a
sustained period of time, and precedes and reinforces
the expression of political power by corporations.
Indeed, the ability to influence politics and policy
generally requires the accumulation and effective
deployment of large amounts of money and other
material resources [21, 22].
We argue that the omission of market power from
public health analyses has led to a number of key discip-
linary blind spots. First, minimal acknowledgement has
been given to examining and understanding important
market structure characteristics that confer firms with
structural power vis-à-vis consumers, buyers, suppliers,
small rival firms, and, in some cases, governments.
Monopolistic/oligopolistic (i.e. market structures with
only one or a small number of firms) and monopsonis-
tic/oligopsonistic (i.e. a market dominated by only one
or a small number of purchasers of given goods) market
structures are of particular concern given that they often
provide leading firms with both the ability to control the
production, marketing and distribution of products in
the value chains in which they operate, as well as the
power to generate profits at the expense of other market
stakeholders, including consumers and suppliers [19, 23].
Indeed, the majority of health-harming industries are
oligopolistic in nature (and, in some cases, oligopsonistic),
which has important ramifications for efforts to curb the
consumption of the products they produce, market, and
sell [23, 24]. Furthermore, concentrated markets often
confer dominant firms with considerable structural and
relational power relative to governments, not least
through their ability to control large amounts of capital
and labour. This structural and relational power can
increase government hesitancy to implement policies and
regulations that could threaten the profit-making abilities
of these dominant firms, as well as the wider stability and
health of national economies [25, 26].
Second, limited public health attention has been given
to analysing the allocation and distribution of resources,
generated wealth and incurred costs via the market
systems of key health-harming industries [27]. The pres-
ence of considerable market power in private markets
can lead to the inefficient allocation and distribution of
resources, wealth, and costs – this constituting a key
component of what is commonly referred to as ‘market
failure’ [28]. Concentrated market power can also be
harnessed to influence democratic political processes,
leading to situations – such as when government policy
makers and regulatory bodies are co-opted to serve pri-
vate interests instead of public interests – in which many
of the social and ecological costs associated with busi-
ness activities (i.e. negative externalities) are not
addressed [29, 30]. Accordingly, from a public health
perspective, market power analyses can inform an
examination into how much profit a health-harming
corporation generates; how much of this accumulated
capital is subsequently allocated to corporate strategies
known to undermine public health; and how the
generated wealth and incurred costs (including externa-
lised costs) from market transactions are distributed
among corporations, society at large, and the
environment.
Finally, market power analysis is well-placed to help
the public health community engage with a broader set
of government policy levers that could promote and
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protect public health through addressing concentrated
market power and related instances of market failure
[31, 32]. Pertinent examples include policy regimes (e.g.
antitrust policy, trade and investment policies, industrial
policy) that (in principle) directly address concentrated
market power, as well as fiscal policy regimes intended
to redistribute the economic burden of externalised costs
from the public towards the corporations responsible for
driving the costs.
Given the aforementioned blind spots and opportun-
ities, the aim of this study was to identify and explore
key literature that could inform the development of a
comprehensive framework to examine corporate market
power from a public health perspective. We focused on
the ultra-processed food (UPF) industry (refer to Supple-
mentary File 1 for a definition) to provide illustrative ex-
amples. The UPF industry was selected for two main
reasons: i) the UPF industry is a key industry of public
health concern, given that diets characterised by high
UPF consumption have been linked with a range of ad-
verse population health outcomes, including all-cause
mortality [2, 3, 33–55]; and ii) the markets of the UPF
industry are markedly heterogeneous across both
product and geographic boundaries, and therefore
the industry is well-placed to highlight the import-
ance of a comprehensive approach to examine
market power [56, 57].
Methods
Literature review
A scoping review of a range of literature was performed
to identify relevant concepts and approaches to identify
and monitor corporate market power. The initial search
strategy involved a review of scholarly articles, books
and other relevant documents in public health, business,
economic, political economy, and antitrust policy litera-
ture. These were sourced from Scopus, Web of Science,
Medline, Business Source Complete, ABI Inform, Pass-
port, Thomas Reuters Westlaw and Lexis Advance data-
bases. The key search terms used were market power,
monopoly/oligopoly power, monopsony/oligopsony
power, and market failure. The initial search was supple-
mented by snowball searching in order to find further
documents in the academic and grey literature. We did
not set any date limits for the search. We included docu-
ments that were published in English and that presented
market power concepts and approaches in accordance
with the analytical framework (discussed below) that we
thought could inform an examination of market power
from a public health perspective. In addition, we in-
cluded documents that described potential areas of gov-
ernment policy for countering corporate market power.
Where relevant, we identified illustrative examples of
market power with regard to the UPF industry.
Analytical framework
We used the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
model as an organising framework for our analysis (see
Fig. 1) [58].
The SCP model was first described by Edward Mason
and Joe Bain in the 1930s, and later popularised by Bain
in the 1950s, as part of a broader agenda to identify and
address both the market power and political power of
firms active in concentrated markets through govern-
ment policy, particularly antitrust policy [19, 59–62].
Since its introduction, it has been very influential in In-
dustrial Organization and antitrust scholarship, fields
that have traditionally concerned themselves with the
structure and functioning of industries and their markets
[63]. The traditional SCP approach posited that it was
industry structure (i.e. the number and concentration of
firms active in a given market) that determines firm con-
duct (i.e. firm strategy and behaviour) within the indus-
try. In turn, firm conduct was seen to determine
industry performance (i.e. the efficiency of an industry in
using, allocating and distributing resources, as well as its
degree of innovation) [60, 63, 64]. Given its deterministic
nature, the analytical and methodological centrepiece of
the traditional SCP approach was the analysis of industry
structure, with a major emphasis on the use of sectoral
or market concentration indices [63]. Accordingly, a
central argument made by traditional SCP scholars was
that the government should intervene to regulate con-
centrated markets, positing that doing so would prevent
anti-competitive firm conduct from occurring, thereby
averting the inefficient allocation of resources [58].
Detractors of this structuralist approach were critical
of its deterministic nature, arguing that firm conduct
(e.g. the pursuit of mergers and acquisitions) could also
shape industry structure, and that firm performance
shapes firm conduct (e.g. firms with substantial accumu-
lated earnings can deliberately incur short-term losses to
Fig. 1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Model, based on Carlton
and Perloff (2000) [58]
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drive out competitors, or innovative firms could leap
frog market leaders) [65]. New approaches were pro-
posed, including those by the New Empirical Industrial
Organization scholars, which placed greater emphasis on
exploring profits (i.e. the financial gain realised by a firm
when earnings exceed the total amount of expenditure)
and price mark-ups (i.e. the difference between the cost
of a good and service and its total cost of production) to
analyse the extent of market power [66]. However, these
new approaches also faced criticism due to their meth-
odological and empirical challenges and limitations. As a
pertinent example, the data required to accurately calcu-
late price mark-ups are often very difficult, if not impos-
sible, for researchers to obtain in the absence of insider
information [20, 65]. Today, a number of antitrust (com-
petition) authorities around the world instead draw from
an adapted SCP model (as represented in Fig. 1), in
which the relationships between each of the components
are not assumed to be one directional and deterministic,
and where market interventions by the government can
potentially target all three components [58, 67–69]. We
used this adapted model to frame our analysis.
Data synthesis
The data extracted from the literature were coded and
grouped according to the three interlinked components
of the SCP model: industry structure, firm conduct, and
industry and firm performance. Within each component,
key concepts and related metrics for analysis of corpor-
ate power from a public health perspective were identi-
fied and discussed. A detailed description of these
metrics is provided in Supplementary File 2. A glossary
of key market power-related terms and definitions are
provided in Table 1.
Results
The structure of an industry and its markets
An assessment of industry and market structure is a
crucial step in exploring the market power of firms, and
there are a number of metrics that can be used to help
Table 1 A glossary of key terms and definitions related to market power
Allocative efficiency The allocation of society’s limited resources to their most valuable use
Barriers to entry (market) Market-based structural factors that impede or prevent a new firm from entering a market
Brand/product
differentiation
The ability of a firm to differentiate its brands/products from those of its rivals
Common shareholder
ownership
The situation that arises when investors, usually institutional investors, own shares in a number of firms active in the
same market
Distributive efficiency The distribution of costs (including externalised costs) and benefits generated from market transactions in the fairest and
most just manner
Dynamic efficiency The ongoing development of both process innovations (e.g. improvements in organisational, production or delivery
methods that reduce cost or increase quality) and product innovations (i.e. new product and packaging development)
that provide benefits to both the firm and society at large
Gross profit margin The difference between the total sales revenue and the total cost of production
Industry A group of establishments that are engaged in the same or similar kinds of production activity
Intangible assets An asset, such as a brand or trademark, that does not have a physical or financial embodiment
Market A market is the product and geographic space in which rivalry and competition take place
Market capitalisation The discounting of a corporation’s expected, risk-adjusted future profit and interest payments to their present value
Market failure The situation defined by an inefficient allocation and distribution of resources, wealth and costs in a market system.
Market strategy A concerted pattern of actions taken in the market environment for the purpose of improving corporate performance
(i.e. maximising profits and shareholder returns)
Monopoly A market structure in which only one firm sells a particular commodity
Monopsony A market structure in which there is only one firm that buys goods and services offered by many suppliers
Non-market strategy A set of actions designed to improve or protect overall corporate performance by influencing the interconnected policy,
regulatory, institutional, ideological and broader socio-political structures that shape market environments
Oligopoly A market structure in which only a few firms sell a particular commodity
Oligopsony A market structure in which there are only a few firms that buys goods and services offered by many suppliers
Productive efficiency The production of products or services at the lowest possible cost
Share repurchase The practice of a firm buying back its own shares
Transfer pricing The manipulation of pricing and payments for intermediate outputs, brand names and patent use between subsidiaries
in order to maximise profits in low-tax jurisdictions
Vertical integration The extent to which a firm owns or controls its suppliers, distributors or buyers
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identify and determine the extent of structural market
power that certain firms hold [60, 64, 67, 70].
Market concentration
For decades, market concentration has been central to
market structure analysis [60, 71, 72]. Highly concen-
trated markets, often understood as both a symptom
and cause of market power, have long been recognised
to confer dominant firms with a considerable structural
advantage over other market-based actors, including
consumers, suppliers, and new market entrants [60, 71–
73]. The two most common metrics to measure market
concentration are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) and the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) [74].
The HHI, calculated by first squaring the market shares
(as percentages) of all active firms in the market and
then summing all of these together, is the main market
concentration metric used by competition authorities
today [75]. The higher the calculated value (maximum
of 10,000), the greater the concentration of the market.
The European Central Bank (and the United States
Department of Justice prior to 2010) considers markets
with a HHI value of greater than 1800 to be highly
concentrated; between 1000 and 1800 to be moderately
concentrated; and less than 1000 to be of a low concen-
tration [76, 77].
In comparison, the CR4 – the most relevant concen-
tration metric prior to the development of the HHI – is
calculated by summing the market shares of the largest
four firms in the market. A market with a CR4 of greater
than 60 is often considered to be a concentrated market;
whereas a market with a CR4 of less than 40 is often
considered to be competitive [74, 78]. In most cases, the
HHI is generally preferred to the CR4 because, unlike
the CR4, the HHI takes into account all firms active in
the market, as well as large variations in the market
shares of the top firms [74]. As an illustration, consider
two hypothetical markets, Market A and Market B. In
Market A, the top four firms have market shares of 65,
10, 3, and 2%, respectively. In Market B, the top four
firms all have market shares of 20%. Let us also assume
that the remaining share of both markets is evenly
spread among a large number of firms, meaning that
their market shares are minimal and therefore do no
impact our calculations. The CR4s of both Market A
and Market B would be 80 (highly concentrated), despite
their markedly different market structures. In compari-
son, the HHI of Market A would be close to 4338 (very
highly concentrated) whereas the HHI of market B
would only be around 1600 (moderately concentrated).
In this case, the large difference between HHI values is
due to the fact that Market A, unlike Market B, is domi-
nated by only one firm.
A major challenge of measuring market concentration
is being able to accurately define the product and geo-
graphic boundaries of the market in question [79, 80]. In
this respect, it is important to point out that although
the terms ‘industry’ and ‘market’ are often used inter-
changeably, they are not the same concepts. According
to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), industry is loosely defined as a
group of establishments that are engaged in the same or
similar kinds of production activity [81]. A market, in
comparison, is the product and geographic space in
which rivalry and competition take place [82]. The UPF
industry, as an example, can be described as a group of
firms engaged in the production of UPFs. A number of
different product markets exist within this industry
because competition does not take place between all
UPF product types, nor does it occur across all geo-
graphic boundaries. For instance, at the consumer level,
breakfast cereal manufacturers are not in direct competi-
tion with soft drink manufacturers; therefore, we can as-
sume that these are separate markets of the UPF
industry. Likewise, a firm that only sells breakfast cereals
in China is not in direct competition with a firm that
only sells breakfast cereals in Western Europe. Table 2
provides an illustration of the differences in HHI values
according to how market boundaries are defined.
As can be seen in the Table 2, one of the potential
risks in defining the product and geographic boundaries
of UPF markets too broadly is that the calculated market
concentration values may underestimate the true con-
centration of the market in question. For instance, if we
calculated the market concentration of the entire global
UPF market, we could be misled into thinking that the
market is competitive (because of the apparent low con-
centration). In reality, however, the global UPF market is
Table 2 An illustration of the variation in Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) values within the ultra-processed food industry
according to the defined product and geographic boundaries
of the market
Soft drink market Carbonated soft drink market
Global 586 2661
Western Europe 562 2932
United Kingdom 818 3493
Note: HHI values > 2500 = very high concentration; 1800–2499 = high
concentration; 1000–1799 =moderate concentration; < 999 = low
concentration. Thresholds based on adapted European Central Bank and
historical US Department of Justice Thresholds [76, 77]
Source: Passport. Market share data based on 2019 off-trade sales data.
Product market boundaries based on Passport’s categorisation of soft drink
products. The soft drink market includes carbonated soft drinks, juice,
concentrates, ready-to-drink tea, ready-to-drink coffee, energy drinks, sports
drinks, Asian specialty drinks, and bottled water. Carbonated soft drinks
include cola carbonates and non-cola carbonates (e.g. lemonade, ginger ale)
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made up of many different, albeit often interconnected,
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market structures (this is
often captured in the economic literature by the
somewhat oxymoronic term monopolistic competi-
tion) [23, 83]. Indeed, in many cases, dominant global
corporations are located at the apex of a patchwork
pyramid of product and geographic markets in which
their market power is variable, but nonetheless typic-
ally concentrated in the majority of their key markets.
Therefore, the structural market power of a global
firm that operates in a number of UPF markets across
different product and geographic dimensions is best
explored by considering the firm’s presence in each of
the markets in which it operates – across both prod-
uct and sometimes segmented market-geographic di-
mensions – rather than by simply assessing its share
of the entire global market.
Common shareholder ownership and its effect on market
structure
The potential effect of common shareholder ownership
on the competitive structure of a market or industry is
an important consideration that can be incorporated
into market concentration calculations. Common share-
holder ownership refers to the situation wherein inves-
tors, usually institutional investors, own shares in a
number of firms active in the same market [84, 85].
Evidence suggests that common shareholder ownership
can be detrimental to competition, especially in highly
concentrated markets, due to increased management
incentives to either tacitly or explicitly collude with
rivals [84, 86–88].
Recent work has highlighted the extent of common
ownership across a number of key sectors in the glo-
bal food value chain, including the UPF manufactur-
ing sector [85]. Five key institutional investors
(Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, Capital Group,
and Fidelity) together own between 15 and 25% of
large global food corporations Mondelez, Tyson
Foods, Kellogg, PepsiCo, General Mills, The Coca-
Cola Company, and Dr. Pepper [85]. To capture the
effect of common shareholder ownership, the modi-
fied HHI (MHHI) metric is commonly used [84]. The
MHHI, which can be interpreted in the same manner
as the HHI, effectively translates the estimated degree
of control or influence by common shareholders over
firms in the same market into a market concentration
value [84]. The MHHI is determined by estimating
the anti-competitive effects of common ownership
(referred to as the MHHI delta), and then adding this
value to the original HHI value of the market. The
steps required to calculate the MHHI delta are de-
tailed elsewhere [89].
Barriers to entry
An examination of barriers to market entry – anti-
competitive practices and structural factors that can
impede or prevent a new firm from entering a market –
is another important component of market structure
analysis. The presence of considerable barriers to entry
confer incumbent firms with structural market power by
reducing the countervailing threat of potential competi-
tion [90]. One of the major barriers to entry in many
UPF markets is the presence of considerable product
and brand differentiation, referring to the ability of a
firm to differentiate its products and brands from those
of its rivals [23]. As a result of many years of sustained
and extensive marketing, large firms that have been
active for a long period of time typically have a substan-
tial advantage over new firms in that they are already
well-recognised and enjoy a large and loyal consumer
base. A case in point is the Coca-Cola Company and its
flagship brand Coca-Cola, which, for decades, has been
one of the most recognisable brands in the world [91].
Other cost-based market barriers to entry include the
productive economies of scale that have been achieved
by large and often globalised incumbent firms, as well as
their well-established relationships and networks with
suppliers, distributors, and large retailers [23, 72, 82, 90,
92–98]. Moreover, the nature of the products in many
industries, such as the UPF industry, means that there is
rarely substantial innovation that would break down
established market-based barriers to entry.
Other elements of market structure
A number of other important market structural ele-
ments also warrant examination in market power ana-
lysis. For instance, vertical integration – the extent to
which a firm owns or controls its suppliers, distribu-
tors or buyers – can confer a firm with a consider-
able structural advantage over its rivals or new
market entrants [99]. Additionally, the degree of im-
port penetration (i.e. the extent to which domestic
consumption comes from imports), the export share
of production (i.e. indicates the importance of foreign
markets for a given industry), and the existence and
nature of explicit or tacit collusion also affect the
competitive structure of an industry [72, 82, 100].
Lastly, the globalisation of production is important in
exploring certain structural advantages that firms may
have over other competitors, as well as governments
[25]. For instance, large firms with subsidiaries in differ-
ent countries can readily mobilise capital across borders,
thereby enabling them to undertake practices designed
to minimise tax obligations and maximise financial
returns [101–103]. Transfer pricing – the manipulation
of pricing and payments for intermediate outputs, brand
names and patent use between subsidiaries in order to
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maximise profits in low-tax jurisdictions – is one such
example [104, 105]. A core financing strategy of Nestlé,
for instance, has been described as locating its
trademarks and patents in Switzerland, its home juris-
diction, in order to set up transnational intra-firm
royalty payments designed to repatriate profits in tax-ef-
fective ways [102]. Similarly, the US Tax Court recently
judged that between 2007 and 2009 The Coca-Cola Co
had illegally transferred its profits to low-tax
jurisdictions in order to avoid about 9 billion USD in
income tax obligations [106].
Firm conduct
Firm conduct is often understood through the analysis
of firm strategy, which is well-placed to explore the ways
in which corporate power is exercised and distributed in
a variety of interconnected contexts, including market
systems [8–11].
Market strategy analysis
In the business literature, firm strategies are often
divided into two components: market strategy and non-
market strategy [107]. Firm market strategies can be
defined as concerted patterns of actions taken in the
market environment for the purpose of improving cor-
porate performance (i.e. maximising profits and share-
holder returns) [107].
Traditionally, early SCP scholars paid particular atten-
tion to the conduct of firms active in highly concen-
trated markets, such as price gouging and collusion [65].
Later, this structure-centric approach to market strat-
egy was adapted and somewhat inverted by Michael
Porter, the founder of modern market strategy, who
effectively argued that corporate managers would be
well-placed to maintain and increase firm profitability
by understanding the competitive structure of their
industry [107–109]. Specifically, Porter’s five frame-
work – one of most well-known strategic manage-
ment frameworks – provides a useful analytical
framework to understand how dominant firms deploy
market strategy to maximise profits over a sustained
period of time, largely through achieving and main-
taining market dominance (refer to Supplementary
File 3 for a brief description of Porter’s five forces
framework) [108, 109]. Adapting this model to the
UPF industry, Wood et al. (2021) describe how dom-
inant UPF corporations use a range of market strat-
egies to maintain market structural advantages over
competitors, new market entrants, suppliers, retailers
and consumers (e.g. acquire rival firms or new start-
up companies with promising technologies; raise bar-
riers to entry through extensive brand differentiation
and supply chain control strategies; shape retail envi-
ronments through practices such as exclusive dealing
arrangements) [99]. In this respect, the boundaries
between firm conduct analysis and market structure
analysis are clearly blurred. A key objective of market
strategy for dominant firms is to maintain market
dominance through shaping the structure of the mar-
kets in which they operate. In turn, this can confer
dominant firms with an increased ability to influence
the behaviour of other market-based actors, thereby
further consolidating their market dominance and
ability to maximise profits over a sustained period of
time. Such a perspective also highlights the somewhat
ambiguous nature of differentiating between the
deployment of effective market strategies, at least
from the firm’s perspective, and the potential need
for government intervention to address anti-
competitive conduct [110].
An integrated approach to corporate strategy
Markets do not exist in a political vacuum, and firms
also deploy a large range of non-market strategies, de-
fined as a set of actions designed to improve or protect
overall corporate performance by influencing the inter-
connected policy, regulatory, institutional, ideological
and broader socio-political structures that shape market
environments [9, 107, 111–114].
Differentiating market and non-market strategy can be
heuristically useful to explore how power imbalances are
created or exacerbated in either market or non-market
environments. However, in reality, market and non-
market strategies often work in tandem – captured by
the term Integrated Strategy – and, in many circum-
stances, the distinction between these two components
of corporate strategy is artificial [107]. This artificial
separation between market and non-market dimensions
of corporate strategy is especially apparent and import-
ant to recognise in market economies wherein
neoliberal-driven structural and ideological changes have
further entrenched markets and market thinking into
social and political structures, if not as a cultural meta-
phenomenon [115, 116]. Take, for example, Nestlé’s
strategy to control marketing channels outside of the
conventional market environment (e.g. healthcare facil-
ities) as a means of increasing the revenue it generates
from breast milk substitute products [117]. This strategy,
well-known to pharmaceutical corporations, effectively
entails the incorporation of healthcare actors (e.g.
nurses, doctors, midwives and community health
workers) into the firm’s marketing channels [117, 118].
As a broader illustration, the corporate social responsi-
bility strategies deployed by large UPF manufacturers
are often considered to have both a market-strategy
dimension (e.g. by increasing brand value) and a non-
market strategy dimension (e.g. through gaining political
and consumer legitimacy) [119].
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Market and firm performance
Examining the performance of an industry entails an
assessment of the use, allocation and distribution of
resources and wealth that occurs via its markets
[120, 121]. Initially, the performance component of
the SCP approach focused on determining the extent
to which monopolists and oligopolists misallocated
resources through raising prices above the marginal
cost of production [65, 122]. From the 1970s
onwards, however, the focus of industry and market
analysis shifted towards consumer welfare, largely as
a consequence of the emerging dominance of the so-
called Chicago School with regard to what is now a
much diluted antitrust policy, led by prominent
scholars such as Judge Bork [120, 123–126]. Bork
and his colleagues promoted the idea, which is still
widely accepted today, that consumer welfare could
best be understood as consumer surplus (i.e. low
consumer prices) [120, 123–126]. This relatively
narrow view of consumer welfare has major prob-
lems from a public health perspective. First, the idea
that low consumer prices are the key signal of the
efficiency and effectiveness of the allocative and eco-
nomic welfare function of private markets means
that minimal regard continues to be given to the
broader social and ecological outcomes of industry
and market activities [127, 128]. Relatedly, and of
fundamental importance, the focus on low consumer
prices has served to legitimise concentrated corpor-
ate power on the grounds that it promotes economic
efficiency, both in terms of driving down prices, as
well as in creating related efficiencies associated with
concentrated market power (we discuss some of
these below) [31, 129].
Thus, in light of these considerations, there remains a
clear need for the field of public health to outline a
broader and more holistic approach to examine industry
performance. We argue that this can, at least in part, be
achieved by incorporating a broader range of social and
ecological considerations into the assessment of eco-
nomic efficiencies, especially allocative and distributive
efficiencies [120, 121].
Market power and allocative (in)efficiency
Allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of society’s
limited resources to their most valuable use [69]. Import-
antly, allocative efficiency can only be achieved if the mar-
ket in question is fair and competitive (i.e. when all
players in a market operate on a level playing field). The
presence of considerable market power by one or more
firms often results in allocative inefficiency because firms
with substantial market power can generate profits – at
the expense of consumers and other market stakeholders
– in excess of what would be possible in a competitive
market environment [19, 130, 131]. In this respect, a key
aspect of market power analysis is to examine the financial
performance of dominant firms, which in turn can provide
insight into the degree of allocative inefficiency of the
market in which they operate.
There exist a range of performance-based metrics that,
when linked with firm conduct and market structure
analyses, can inform an examination of the extent of
market power held by a firm. Long term trends of mar-
ket capitalisation values – defined as the discounting of
expected, risk-adjusted future profit and interest pay-
ments to their present value – is a pertinent example,
and, for publicly listed companies, can be calculated by
multiplying the number of shares a firm has by its share
price [15]. In the critical political economy literature,
market capitalisation has been described as a ‘symbolic
ritual that converts and reduces qualitatively different
power relationships into a singular quantity’ [15]. In ef-
fect, market capitalisation speaks not just to market
power, but more broadly to corporate power, given that
the capitalisation process essentially quantifies the social,
political and economic influence of a corporation [132].
Related to market capitalisation is the ability of a firm
to generate future earnings from its assets and liabilities.
In general, the larger the earnings of firm, the greater
the capitalisation [15]. Examining the earnings of a firm
can complement the assessment of a firm’s market capit-
alisation, and in cases where market capitalisation can-
not be determined (e.g. unlisted firms), earnings can
instead be used to roughly estimate the ability of a firm
to capitalise its differential power relations [15]. A com-
monly used indicator of corporate earnings is ‘Earnings
before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation’
(EBITDA) – a metric that captures a firm’s earnings
prior to financial and accounting deductions [133]. Simi-
lar to market capitalisation, for market power analysis,
an examination of a firm’s earnings is best conducted
over a long period of time (e.g. over 10 years), because
firms with substantial accumulated profits can often
deploy strategies that incur short term financial losses to
drive out rivals (e.g. using predatory pricing) [65].
Gross profit margins, calculated by subtracting the
total cost of production from total sales revenue, is
another informative firm performance metric for market
power analysis [134]. Although gross profit margins are
less reliable as an indicator of market power compared
to metrics such as the Lerner Index (i.e. (consumer price
of a product – marginal cost of a product)/consumer
price of a product), the latter requires data that are often
not accessible. Gross profit margins tend to be most
revealing in cases where the gross profit margins of a
firm are considerably higher than its competitors, as well
as the industry and sector averages, over a sustained
period of time [135].
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The value of intangible assets owned by a firm
should also be considered when identifying and moni-
toring market power. An intangible asset (e.g. brand
loyalty, patents, trademarks) is an asset that does not
have a physical or financial embodiment [136]. It has
been described that in the current global political
economy, power has tended to accumulate into the
hands of a limited number of firms that own the ma-
jority of intangible assets relative to what exists
within the global value chain they operate [137, 138].
This metric is particularly pertinent for the UPF
industry given that brands – aspects of which can be
trademarked – play a crucial revenue-generating role
for large UPF manufacturers [139–141].
Other forms of allocative inefficiency
Allocative inefficiency also results from other market-
based failings, all of which are deeply interlinked and
perpetuated by market power. A highly important cat-
egory of allocative inefficiency at the firm level occurs
when firms fail to incorporate all of the costs of a
product or service into the price set by the relevant
market. Externalised costs – commonly referred to as
negative externalities – essentially occur when firms
are not held financially accountable for the collateral
damage they cause to society and the environment
[69, 142]. Although not typically framed in this way,
the CDoH literature contains a vast amount of evi-
dence that describes, and, in some cases, quantifies, a
diverse range of social and ecological-related negative
externalities generated by a number of health-harming
industries, including the UPF industry [2, 32, 143,
144]. Examples include, among many, the substantial
global disease burden from diets high in UPFs, as well
as the devastating ecological impact of the plastic pol-
lution generated by UPF manufacturers [2, 3, 33–55,
145–147]. Similarly, the CDoH literature has also
explored the ways in which the corporate allocation
of money and resources towards certain practices,
such as lobbying and intense marketing of unhealthy
products, exacerbates the externalisation process [9,
11, 27, 148, 149].
Allocative inefficiency also occurs when information
relevant to consumer purchasing decisions, as well as
other market transactions, is not evenly shared and
made readily available. This type of market failure is
often referred to as the presence of information asym-
metry [130]. There is ample evidence that highlights that
information asymmetry is commonplace in UPF mar-
kets, where practices such as misleading labelling and
the failure to disclose all relevant social (including
health) and environmental costs are frequently adopted
by large firms [19, 99, 130].
Distribution of costs and benefits
All forms of allocative inefficiency in private markets are
typically compounded by an unequal distribution of
costs (including those externalised) and benefits gener-
ated from market transactions [150]. As an illustrative
example, the externalised social and ecological costs (e.g.
increase in global burden of non-communicable diseases;
the adverse ecological impact from plastic pollution) cre-
ated by the global soft drink industry disproportionately
affect particular demographic groups, social classes, and
geographies (e.g. young children; lower socioeconomic
classes; low- and middle-income countries) [32, 151–
160]. On the other hand, shareholders and corporate ex-
ecutives – groups that tend to be over-represented by a
small and privileged elite – largely benefit from the
wealth generated from the soft drink industry [19, 161,
162]. Therefore, we argue that an examination of the
distribution of incurred costs, as well as the corporate
transfer of wealth, should be incorporated into a critical
performance analysis from a public health perspective,
and more broadly, into an expanded economic concept
of consumer or social welfare. Corporate wealth transfer
mechanisms that warrant scrutiny include the extent of
tax minimisation, the value of dividends paid to share-
holders relative to the wealth transferred to other stake-
holders (e.g. employees), and the value of shares
repurchased by a firm [163]. Share repurchases refer to
the practice of a firm buying back its own shares, which
has been described as a way of effectively redistributing
wealth to shareholders and company executives through
the manipulation of share prices and performance
metrics (e.g. earnings per share) linked to executive pay
compensation [164, 165].
Dynamic efficiency
Dynamic efficiency refers to the development of both
process innovations (e.g. improvements in organisa-
tional, production or delivery methods that reduce cost
or increase quality) and product innovations (i.e. new
product and packaging development) that provide bene-
fits to both the firm and society at large [166]. There is
conflicting evidence as to whether market power
increases or decreases innovation [167, 168]. In any case,
in relation to health-harming industries, product and
process innovations that address the negative external-
ities of pre-existing processes and products should, of
course, be welcomed. However, innovations that pre-
tend, or only partly address, pre-existing externalities
should be scrutinised, and if appropriate, discredited. It
has been described, for instance, that many innovations
of the UPF industry adopt nutritional reductionist and
greenwashing principles, and thereby fail to provide true
social and ecological benefits [169, 170].
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Productive efficiency
Productive efficiency refers to the production of prod-
ucts or services at the lowest possible cost [121, 123]. In
certain situations, such as when firms have achieved
economies of scale in production, market power and
productive efficiency can have a direct relationship
[166]. High levels of productive efficiency of health-
harming industries pose a clear problem for public
health because, in the majority of markets, the lower the
consumer price of a health-harming product, the greater
its consumption, and thus, the greater its public health
burden. Given the often perverse relationship between
lower consumer prices and greater public health costs,
the public health community should concern itself with
comparing the productive efficiency between health-
harming corporations and the organisations that
produce healthier and more sustainable product
alternatives.
Use of natural resources
Finally, an assessment of economic efficiencies from
both a public and planetary health perspective should
also take into account that ecological resources are
finite, and that issues pertaining to the scale of
resource use cannot simply be reduced to issues of
allocation or distribution [150]. Several authors argue
that, in many cases, it may not be appropriate for the
use of scarce natural resources (e.g. land, water) for
business activities, as well as the production of waste
and pollution that results from business activities (e.g.
carbon emissions, plastic pollution), to be coordinated
by the price signals of a market [150, 171, 172].
Instead, it is argued that social decisions that reflect
ecological limits need to be made to organise re-
source use [150]. In this respect, the public and
planetary health implications of a firm’s relationship
with key planetary boundaries (e.g. climate change,
freshwater use, land use, biodiversity loss, and chem-
ical pollution), as described by Rockström et al. (2009)
and popularised by Raworth’s Doughnut Economics
model, could be considered as a separate, albeit
interlinked, source of economic efficiency [171, 173].
As an example, in certain water-scarce regions of the
world, concerns have been raised about the ways in
which the bottlers of Coca-Cola Co and PepsiCo’s soft
drink products have exacerbated the rapid depletion of
water sources for surrounding communities [174175].
Towards the development of a framework to examine
market power from a public health perspective
Drawing from our findings, we argue that an expanded
SCP model described throughout the results section and
depicted below (refer to Fig. 2) could serve as a useful
point of departure to inform the development of a com-
prehensive framework to analyse market power from a
public health perspective. Such a framework would be
well-placed to explore the ways in which market power
mediates, and indeed is mediated by, industry and mar-
ket structure, firm conduct, and market and firm per-
formance. Moreover, by comprehensively exploring
market power through the interconnected analysis of the
three components of the SCP model, the public health
community could be better equipped to identify and en-
gage with key government policy regimes that could be
used to curb concentrated market power.
Fig. 2 An adapted SCP model that could be used to inform the development of a comprehensive framework to analyse market power from a
public health perspective
Wood et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:41 Page 10 of 17
Locating market power within the broader non-market
environment
We recognise that market systems are embedded within
the underlying political, legal, cultural, ideological, and
technological contexts of capitalist societies, which are
systems that markets and capital have historically co-
produced [17]. In this respect, market power research
needs to be linked with work that explores the existence,
use and distribution of corporate power in social and
political structures traditionally outside the reach of
markets and market thinking [11]. For example, market
power analysis could be complemented with an explor-
ation of corporate influence in and on the underlying
structures and networks that govern and regulate the
rules, processes and norms of the markets in which they
operate [176]. Tools for such endeavours include
network analysis, and closer monitoring of industry
interactions with government bodies, committees, and
regulators.
From a theoretical perspective, and in similar fashion
to Mikler (2018), we conceputalise corporate market
power and corporate political power as a perpetuating
unity, rather than as separate entities [177]. Corporate
market power can lead to accumulated material re-
sources that can create and reinforce corporate influ-
ence in the political environment (i.e. political power),
just as corporate political power can both protect (e.g.
through regulatory capture) and perpetuate corporate
market power (e.g. through shaping corporate-friendly
trade and investment agreements) [11]. In addition, the
existence, use and distribution of corporate power
varies across time and space, and can be fungible across
and between markets and jurisdictions. For instance,
the increased material power of a firm that results from
its power in a specific market can be later deployed to
influence the political environment in a different
jurisdictional space [11].
Examples of government policy to address concentrated
market power
The proposed framework is well-placed to help explore
a number of policy levers that can protect and promote
the interests of public health through curbing market
power. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all
such relevant policy regimes; instead, we briefly discuss
the potential role of a few key examples.
Antitrust policy is a policy regime that, we argue,
deserves more attention from public health scholars.
Under most current antitrust policy frameworks around
the world, the scope for government intervention into mar-
kets through antitrust enforcement is limited. As
mentioned earlier, this is largely due to the ideological
hegemony of the Chicago School’s thinking on antitrust
policy, wherein concentrated market structures and
consolidated market power are justified and legitimised on
the grounds of consumer surplus arguments [31, 178].
Historically, however, the primary goals of antitrust policy
were to prevent and address the concentration of market
power as means of both promoting economic justice and
protecting democracy [19, 30, 31, 61, 179]. Today, the neo-
Brandeisian anti-monopoly movement (named after Justice
Brandeis who served under President Wilson in the early
1900s) seeks to revive the historical goals of antitrust policy,
and it is with this movement that public health could aim
to engage [180]. Although the main focus of this movement
is currently on the big digital technology corporations (in
particular, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Micro-
soft), there is likely to be merit in the public health commu-
nity participating in antitrust policy discussions with
reference to addressing (other) health-harming oligopolies
that drive the CDoH [180].
Beyond the way in which the goals of antitrust policy
are interpreted today, another important limitation of
current antitrust policy regimes around the world is that
they are typically bound by their jurisdictional boundar-
ies, and thus, in most cases, fail to operate across geo-
graphic boundaries (and more broadly, planetary
boundaries) [171, 181]. This is a major issue given the
globalised nature of value chains and market transac-
tions, as well as the fact that the social and ecological
burden of certain business activities clearly transcend
jurisdictional boundaries [171]. In this respect, trade and
investment policies could serve as an important lever for
addressing the market power of global corporations, es-
pecially those that operate in health-harming industries
and seek to expand their reach and dominance into new
developing markets [19]. A challenge for low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) in particular, how-
ever, is that neoliberal global trade, investment and intel-
lectual property regimes often facilitate the globalisation
and concentration of market power of firms based in ad-
vanced capitalist economies, especially the US and the
EU and its members [19]. International trade agree-
ments, for instance, often restrict the ability of LMICs to
prevent powerful, health-harming foreign corporations
from entering and penetrating their developing national
economies [19].
As a final example, industrial policy could also serve as
an important policy lever to address the market power
of dominant health-harming corporations. Specific to
the food sector, industrial policy – that is, government
policy that shifts resources from one industry to another
– could play a critical role in promoting the economic
efficiency of organisations that produce healthier and
more sustainable food alternatives to those of UPF man-
ufacturers [182]. Policy actions in this respect could en-
compass government investment in infrastructure that
supports local food supply chains for perishable products
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(e.g. improved transport infrastructure and cold chains);
supporting farmers to engage in direct sales in produce
markets; increasing support for alternative food business
models such as food cooperatives; developing integrated
food and agricultural knowledge and innovation systems
to address information asymmetries inherent in the food
and agricultural value chain; and implementing policies
that mandate the public procurement of healthy, local
and sustainable food products [183–185].
Discussion
In this paper we have used the SCP model to identify
and describe key concepts and metrics that could inform
the future development of a comprehensive framework
to analyse corporate market power from a public health
perspective. We have provided a number of examples
throughout the paper specific to the UPF industry.
Building upon the work of scholars who have, for
decades, attempted to identify and monitor the presence,
use and outcomes of market power, we have described
how the SCP model is well-placed to help public health
researchers explore the interrelations between the struc-
ture of industries, the conduct of dominant firms within
these industries, and the overall ability of markets and
firms to efficiently allocate and distribute the scarce
resources of society. Throughout the paper, we have also
suggested how the SCP model could be expanded to
take into account a broader range of public health
considerations.
While our paper outlines key concepts and metrics to
guide market power analysis, it will be necessary to
develop a detailed protocol for analysis, including the
identification of available data sources, specification of
time frames for analysis, and guidance for interpretation
of all indicators and metrics. Once developed, such a
framework could be adapted to examine market power
in different industries of public health concern, such as
UPFs, fossil fuels, alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. Re-
garding the UPF industry, a comprehensive market
power framework could be incorporated into the work
of existing research networks interested in examining
the role of the private sector in shaping and influencing
food supply chains and food environments. INFORMAS
(International Network for Food and Obesity/non-com-
municable diseases Research, Monitoring and Action
Support) is one such example, and research on market
power could be well-placed to help achieve the aims of
the network [186]. Given the general concerns about
how corporate wealth transfer mechanisms contribute to
wealth and social inequality, a comprehensive market
power framework could also help inform an exploration
of the ways in which market power can exacerbate
wealth and social inequalities, especially in market
economies [122, 164].
A key strength of this paper is that it links work from
economics, business, global political economy and anti-
trust policy literature with public health. Tackling a
complex topic such as market power demands such an
interdisciplinary approach. The paper has a number of
important limitations. While we have attempted to
provide a comprehensive set of concepts and metrics for
analysis, we recognise that some of the data required for
such analysis is not publicly accessible. While certain
data can be collected from publicly available sources
such as annual firm reports, national trade databases,
and stock exchange websites, access to some of the data
(e.g. historical company fundamental data, sales revenue
data disaggregated by product and geography) typically
requires subscriptions to a number of market and
business-related databases. Furthermore, there are cur-
rently no standardised benchmarks to guide interpret-
ation of many of the key metrics discussed. In any case,
contextual analysis is important and interpretation needs
to consider a range of findings. Nevertheless, bench-
marks are likely to emerge over time and this could as-
sist future analyses. Finally, a key challenge of the
framework described in this paper is that public health
practitioners may not have the necessary skills in eco-
nomics, business, finance and antitrust policy to use and
interpret some the proposed metrics. Building these
skills should therefore be considered a focus area, par-
ticularly for those scholars interested in scrutinising and
addressing corporate market power. Fostering collabora-
tions with groups from economics, finance, business and
antitrust policy would also help in this regard.
Conclusions
There is increasing evidence that the unchecked corpor-
ate power of dominant firms, especially those in health-
harming commodity industries, poses a major threat to
efforts to protect and promote population health. Ac-
cordingly, it is critical that the public health community
focuses on understanding, identifying, tracking, and ad-
dressing corporate power.
Corporate market power is a vital power concept that
warrants more public health attention as part of a
broader corporate power research agenda. We argue that
market power can be broadly understood as playing a
central role in perpetuating corporate power through
the shaping of market environments as a means of en-
suring the ongoing accumulation of substantial profits.
Empirically, the SCP model described in this paper could
act as a useful starting point to examine corporate
market power from a public health point of view, as well
as to engage with the policy, regulatory and institutional
levers designed, at least in principle, to curb the concen-
trated market power of firms that generate profit at the
expense of population health.
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